The crisis at the heart of non-proliferation
The Iran nuclear dispute exposes a double standard in the global non-proliferation regime.
- The treaty combines non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear cooperation.
- The JCPOA placed Iran's nuclear programme under intrusive inspections and strict limits.
- The United States withdrew from the JCPOA and sanctions returned after the withdrawal.
The Iran nuclear dispute has revived criticism of the global non-proliferation regime. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 creates unequal obligations between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, and selective enforcement weakens the legitimacy of the system.
Iran was asked to give up uranium enrichment and accept strict limits while established nuclear powers retained their arsenals. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 is portrayed as a hierarchy between nuclear haves and have-nots rather than a genuine disarmament compact.
Iran operated within a legal framework and accepted intrusive inspections under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and sanctions returned after the withdrawal.
UPSC can frame the issue as a treaty-design and global-governance question: how far the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 balances non-proliferation with disarmament, why the Iran nuclear crisis revived criticism of selective enforcement, and whether the international order can remain credible without universal disarmament commitments.
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